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Abstract: Work-related training is considered to be very important for providing the workforce with the 
necessary skills for maintaining and enhancing the competitiveness of the firms and the economy. 
According to the classical human capital theory general training is entirely financed by workers. 
This prediction is at odds with the empirical evidence. This observation inspired new theoretical 
models with frictional labour markets aiming at explaining the empirical evidence. These 
frictions create incentives for firms to invest in general training. Most important from a policy 
point of view is that the amount of training in this frictional world is below the optimal first-best 
solution achieved in the classical human capital model. Instruments to increase investment in 
training depend on the dominating kind of friction. This paper tries to identify the sources of 
frictions in the Swiss labour market. The results indicate that internal wage guarantees 
(minimum wages set in labour contracts) may play an important role. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the classical human capital theory general training is entirely financed by workers 
who in turn reap all the returns as well (Becker, 1964). This prediction, however, is at odds with 
the empirical evidence. Many studies show that firms often fully finance training of their workers 
that is general in nature. Not surprisingly, there is also evidence of small returns of general 
training to workers and relatively large returns to firms. These observations inspired new 
theoretical models aiming at explaining the empirical evidence. Acemoglu and Pischke 
(1999a,b), among others, developed a model with frictional labour markets. These frictions create 
incentives for firms to invest in general training. Most important from a policy point of view is 
that the amount of training in this frictional world is below the optimal first-best solution 
achieved in the classical Becker model. Given the importance of training for productivity and 
growth it is natural to ask whether the amount of investment can be improved. Since we are in a 
world of second-best policy interventions may improve welfare. Which instrument is most 
effective in increasing training investments depends on the kind of friction predominant in the 
labour market. If information asymmetries play an important part a more regulated training 
system with credentials providing more information might be helpful. If training costs are too 
high relative to the returns training subsidies might be useful in increasing training investment. 
However, at the moment neither the theoretical nor the empirical knowledge is sufficient for clear 
policy recommendations.  
The aim of this paper is to provide further empirical evidence by trying to identify the kind of 
frictions that are predominant in the Swiss labour market. The empirical strategy relies on 
possibly differential returns to training for workers staying with or quitting the training firm. The 
classical human capital theory predicts that these returns should be equal if training is purely 
general, and higher for the stayers if training has a firm-specific component. Most of the 
frictional models predict smaller returns for movers. Larger returns for movers are predicted by 
models where firms face an internal minimum wage, either for contractual reasons (a wage 
“guarantee”) or due to moral hazard (e.g. efficiency wages). The empirical evidence is mixed. 
For male workers there is evidence for higher returns at new firms which supports the models 
with wage guarantees. This in turn suggests that training subsidies might be effective in 
increasing the level of training investment. However, for female workers there is no evidence for 
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higher returns at outside firms. In fact, all estimated returns to training are not significantly 
different from zero. Overall, the empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
The paper is organised as follows: section 2 sketches the main aspects of the new training 
literature and its implications for empirical research. The econometric approach is outlined in 
section 3, and section 4 discussed the data used in this paper. Section 5 presents the estimation 
results, section 6 concludes. 
2. The “new” training literature 
To set out the main principles of the new training literature (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1998, 1999) 
consider a simple two period model. The focus is on general training, i.e. human capital that can 
be transferred across firms. The classical human capital model (Becker, 1964) can be summarised 
as follows: 
• At time t = 0 there is an initial production of y0, and the firm decides on the level of 
training τ, with (0, )τ ∈ ∞ . Training costs are c(τ) with c c(0) 0; ( ) ' 0; ( ) '' 0c= ⋅ > ⋅ > . The 
second assumption assures that it is always socially beneficial to have some amount of 
positive training. 
• At time t = ½ the firm makes a wage offer w to the worker, and other firms compete for 
the worker. The worker decides whether to quit and work for another firm. Assume 
there are many identical firms who can use the general skills of the worker, and the 
worker does not incur any costs in the process of changing firms. This assumption 
makes the labour market essentially competitive. 
• At time t = 1 there is a second and final period of production, where output is equal to 
1 ( ),  with (0) 0, '( ) 0,  and ''( ) 0y f f f fτ+ = ⋅ > ⋅ < . Discounting is ignored for simplicity. 
The socially optimal level of training is given by the condition c '( *) '( *)fτ τ=
1 1 ( *w y f
. Becker has 
shown that the equilibrium is achieved when the second period wage )τ= +  and the first 
period wage 0 0 ( *)w y c τ= − . Therefore, in this economy the efficient level of training will be 
achieved with firms bearing none of the cost of training, and workers financing training by taking 
a wage cut in the first period of employment. If workers face credit constraints or binding 
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contracts are not possible training investment will be below the social optimum. The general 
conclusion that firms will not bear any costs still holds in these cases. 
Empirically, there is a lot of evidence against this prediction of the classical human capital model. 
Table 1 summarises some of this evidence. According to the subjective evaluation of workers 70 
– 85% of all training courses are viewed as being general training. The majority of these courses 
are at least partially financed by the firms (see e.g. Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998, for the USA, 
Booth and Bryan, 2002, for the UK, and Backes-Gellner und Schmidtke, 2000, for Germany). 
The German apprenticeship system is also mentioned as an example against the predictions of the 
classical model. The same can be argued for the Swiss apprenticeship system which is very 
similar to the German system. 
The “new training literature” attempts to explain these observed facts. The central deviation from 
the classical model concerns frictions in the labour market. Consider the following simple two 
period model: in the first period the worker or the firm decide how much to invest in the worker’s 
general human capital, τ. For simplicity normalise output in the first period to zero. In the second 
period the worker either stays with the firm and produces output ( )y f τ= . The worker will be 
paid a wage rate ( )w τ  as a function of his skill levels τ. If he quits he will receive an outside 
wage ( )v τ . Costs of training are again given by c( )τ . Training is assumed to be technologically 
general, i.e. ( )f τ  is the same for all firms. Now assume that there are frictions in the labour 
market such that ( )v ( )fτ τ< , i.e. if the worker quits he will get an outside wage below his 
marginal product .This creates a surplus ( ) ( )f vτ τ−  that can be shared between the current firm 
and the worker. Assuming Nash bargaining the wage of the worker is  
(1) [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w v f vτ τ β τ τ= + − ,  
where [0,1]β ∈  is the bargaining power of the worker. Note that training costs do not affect the 
equilibrium wage.  
Under the assumption that τ is determined by the investments of the firm and the worker, who 
independently choose their contributions to costs, cf and cw, i.e. τ is given by ( ) fc c wcτ = + . Now 
firm and worker bargain over the second period wage ( )w τ , where the threat point for the worker 
is the outside wage ( )v τ , and the threat point of the firm is not to produce. Acemoglu and 
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Pischke (1999a) show that if there is training either the firm or the worker will bear all costs. 
Since we are interested in firm financed general training we focus on this case. 
The firm maximises profits by choosing τ, where profits are given by  
(2) [ ] [ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( )f w c f v cπ τ τ τ τ β τ τ τ= − − = − − − .  
First order conditions are  
(3) [ ](1 ) '( ) '( ) '( ) 0f v cβ τ τ τ− − − = . 
If '( ) '( ) 0f vτ τ− =
'( ) '( ) 0f v
 the firm will not invest in training and the worker will bear all training costs. 
This is the case of perfectly competitive labour markets. Firms will only invest in training if 
τ τ− > . Hence it is not sufficient that outside wages are below the worker’s 
productivity in order to generate firm financed training. It is necessary that productivity increases 
more than outside wages with increasing human capital. Acemoglu and Pischke call this situation 
a compressed wage structure. The external compressed wage structure will translate into an 
internal wage structure implying that '( ) '( ) 0f wτ τ− >  as well.1 One of the most important 
implications of this model is that investment in training will be less than in the frictionless world, 
i.e. *τ τ< . 
Acemoglu and Pischke show that a variety of labour market frictions can lead to wage 
compression. These include search costs, asymmetric information, complementarity of general 
and firm-specific skills, efficiency and minimum wages. While the first three directly compress 
the external wage structure (and the internal wage structure only indirectly) the latter two directly 
compress the internal wage structure. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) develop a contractual 
model which has the same implications as the efficiency wage model. The main idea of this kind 
of model is that firms set an internal minimum wage (a wage guarantee) below which wages 
cannot fall. The reason for this wage guarantee is a signal to employers that firms will not extract 
excessive returns to training from workers. This wage guarantee is binding for workers whose 
productivity is below the minimum wage. If firms invest in training of these workers they can 
increase their productivity without having to increase the wage as long as productivity remains 
lower than the wage guarantee. This mechanism creates the compressed internal wage structure. 
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The important implication for the following empirical analysis is that this model implies that 
workers may be able to increase their wages by changing firms because the wage guarantee may 
not be binding at an outside firm. Hence the central question of the empirical analysis is whether 
workers who received training in the past year and changed jobs after training have higher returns 
to training than those workers who stayed with the training firm. The classical human capital 
model and the other sources of labour market frictions are not compatible with this prediction.  
3. Econometrics 
In order to analyse the predictions from the previous section I specify the following wage 
equation (similar specifications are used by Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998, and Booth and 
Bryan, 2002). 
(4) 
' 'ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt i ij ijt
w x Tβ α ξ
ξ µ υ ε
= + +
= + +
,  
where  
wijt :  log of monthly earnings of worker i in firm j in period t 
xijt :  vector of worker and firm characteristics (age (cubic), tenure (cubic), education, job 
position, sex, nationality, indicators for sectors, regions, and time) 
Tijt:  training indicators, training of worker i in firm j in period t 
µi:  permanent worker-specific effect (unobserved) 
νij::  match-specific component (unobserved) 
εijt::  transitory random effect 
Estimating the model by fixed effects will eliminate iµ . This will also solve the endogeneity of 
 caused by a possible correlation between training participation and unobserved ability or 
motivation contained in 
itT
iµ . Previous training is also contained in iµ , and there is evidence in the 
data that training participation is strongly correlated over time.  
                                                                                                                                                                                            
1  This follows from the derivative of , which is ' , 
as long as β <1. 
[ ]( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w v f vτ τ β τ τ= + − [ ]' ' ' ' ' (1 )w v f v f vβ β β= + − = + −
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The employer-match effect ijν  is also likely correlated with T  because the probability of training 
will be higher if the match is good. Following Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) the employer-
specific effect 
it
ijν  is approximated by a dummy variable taking the value of one in case of a job 
change.2 The base case is the job in the first observation period. 
4. Data 
I employ data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS). The SLFS is conducted by the Swiss 
Federal Statistical Office on a yearly basis. Each year about 18’000 households are interviewed. 
The SLFS is designed as a rotating panel, i.e. individuals are interviewed at most in 5 consecutive 
years. In the years 1996 and 1999 there were special questionnaires relating to vocational 
training. The questions determine who had any training in the past twelve months, who had 
work-related training, whether this training was financed by the firm or took place during work 
time, whether training ended with a certificate, and duration of training. From these questions I 
constructed indicator variables for work-related training, work-related training (at least partially) 
sponsored by the firm, certified work-related training. In addition, all waves of the SLFS contain 
information on work-related training in the past twelve months.  
Unfortunately, there was a significant change in the questionnaire regarding income between 
1995 and 1996.3 Since the estimation method is based on the incomes before and after training it 
is impossible to use the 1995/1996 waves for the analysis. Hence I focus on the 1999 wave. I 
constructed a balanced 2-years panel covering the years 1998/1999.  
Only full-time workers are included in the sample. Work-related training is defined as training in 
the past 12 months that is either employer-financed or self-financed. Training duration must be at 
least a week, and only completed training spells are considered. There is no way to identify 
general and firm-specific training in the data. Hence I assume that the training measured by these 
indicators is at least partially general in nature. 
Table 2 breaks down training frequency by socio-demographic characteristics. Almost half of all 
full-time workers participated in some work-related training. Roughly two third are firm 
                                                          
2  There is still a possibility of a correlation between ijν  and Tit. Loewenstein and Spletzer show that the differential 
return between stayers and movers will be underestimated in that case, independent of the sign of the correlation. 
3  Until 1995 respondents were asked to state their full labour income, including income from jobs other than their 
main job. Since 1996 the questionnaire differentiated between main and additional jobs. 
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financed. There is a clear difference by gender: 50% of the women have to finance work-related 
training themselves. Firm-sponsored training is above average for better qualified workers and 
workers in large firms. On the other hand, the variation with age or tenure is relatively low. Only 
for workers with more than ten years of tenure there is a somewhat larger probability of firm-
sponsored training. 
The dependent variable is the log of monthly earnings. I trimmed the sample by excluding the top 
and bottom percentile of the earnings distribution in order to avoid that results are driven by 
outliers. Movers and stayers are identified by an indicator variable “job change”. Furthermore, it 
is possible to split the movers into quits and lay-offs. The descriptive statistics of these variables 
can be found in Tables 3 and 4 in the next section. 
5. Results 
Tables 3 and 4 show the estimation results of the central parameters for men and women. All 
coefficients are multiplied by 100, hence the figures represent the effect in %. The full set of 
estimation results is presented in Appendix A. In column (1) there is no distinction between 
movers and stayers in the returns to training. Column (2) shows the results when returns to firm-
sponsored training are allowed to differ between movers and stayers. Finally, in column (3) the 
movers are split into quits and lay-offs. Returns to self-financed training are not differentiated 
between movers and stayers. 
Column (1) of Table 3 indicates that for men there is a significant return to training of roughly 
1.5% - 2%. The returns do not differ significantly between firm-sponsored and self-financed 
training. The effect of a job change is about 3%. These results conform to those in Gerfin et al. 
(2003). Separating the returns to firm-sponsored training for stayers and movers clearly indicates 
that the returns are larger for movers by a factor of 3. This is what would be expected according 
to the models with wage guarantees. Further differentiating job changes into quits and lay-offs 
(column 3) yields the expected result that only quitters benefit from a job change, both in terms 
of the match component and of the returns to training. Note however that the fraction of workers 
who quit and especially who are laid off after training is very small. Overall, the results in Table 
3 support the theoretical model with internal wage guarantees. Similar results have been found by 
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998) for the USA and by Booth and Bryan (2002) for the UK. 
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Table 4 reveals that the results are much less clear cut for women. Column (1) indicates that there 
are no significant returns to both firm-sponsored and self-financed training. Again, this result 
corresponds to the results in Gerfin et al (2003). There is a significant positive effect of a job 
change of about 3%. Estimating differential effects of firm-sponsored training for stayers and 
movers does not change the results at all. Still all returns are insignificant and have 
counterintuitive signs. The estimation results in column (3) are not reported because there is only 
one laid-off worker with firm-sponsored training in the sample. Overall, for women the 
estimation results are difficult to assess. 
6. Conclusions 
This paper addressed the empirical question whether there are differential returns to general 
training at the firm providing the training and at outside firms. The evidence is mixed. For female 
workers there are no significant effects of training on wages at all. For male workers, on the other 
hand, there is clear evidence that returns are larger at outside firms. This evidence is consistent 
with recent theoretical models of training in frictional markets where the frictions are introduced 
through internal minimal wage floors, due to wage guarantees in labour contracts or efficiency 
wages. Given that the models with labour market frictions imply training investments below the 
social optimum achieved in the classical human capital model the question arises whether there 
policy instruments to improve training investments. In the case of internal wage guarantees 
theory indicates that training costs are too high to achieve higher investment. This suggests that 
training subsidies might be a useful instrument. This conclusion, however, is still rather tentative 
given that the empirical evidence is not clear-cut. Further work, both theoretical and empirical, is 
necessary in order to provide more reliable answers to this very important problem. 
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Tables 
Table 1: International Comparisons  
Country  Proportion of workers 
receiving training  
(in %) 
of these financed by firm 
(completely or partially)  
(in %) 
Proportion of general 
training (subjective view of 
workers) 
USA (1993) 18 60-80 70-85 
UK (1998) 31 62 85 
Germany I(1986-88) 28 62 - 
Germany  II(1990-92) 24 66 70 
Switzerland (1999) 32 80 -  
Sources: Loewenstein und Spletzer (1998a,b) for USA; Booth and Bryan (2002) for UK, Pischke (2001) for Germany 
I, Backes-Gellner und Schmidtke (2000) for Germany II, Gerfin et al (2003) for Switzerland 
Table 2: Incidence of training (private sector) 
    Age Tenure    
 Total  High educa-
tional level  
female  25-
35 
35-
45 
45-
60 
0-2 2-5 5-10 10
+ 
firm size  
> 100 
superviso-
ry position  
Firm-sponsored  32 44 28 30 35 32 31 30 29 36 43 41 
self-financed  17 20 24 19 14 13 19 20 18 14 16 18 
Own calculations’ SLFS 1999. Sample consists of full-time workers, excluding self-employed 
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Table 3: Estimation Results, males (all coefficients multiplied by 100), 1998-1999 
Variable Mean (1) (2) (3) 
Training, firm sponsored 0.369 1.498 (0.511) -  - 
Training, self-financed 0.130 1.959 (0.734) 1.997 (0733) 1.986 (0.734) 
Training stayers   -   
   firm-sponsored,  0.345 - 1.298 (0.528) 1.299 (0.529) 
Training movers  -   
   firm-sponsored,  0.025 - 4.152 (1.844)  
   firm-sponsored (quits) 0.017 -  4.764 (2.197) 
   firm-sponsored (lay-offs) 0.008 -  2.779 (3.356) 
Match-component     
job change 0.077 3.206 (1.162) 2.309 (1.307)  
quit 0.054 -  2.752 (1.465) 
lay-off 0.023 -  1.340 (2.083) 
Number of obs   3958 3958 3958 
Number of persons   1979 1979 1979 
R-squared – within  0.08 0.08 0.08 
R-squared– between  0.11 0.11 0.11 
R-squared – overall  0.11 0.11 0.10 
Notes: Own calculations, SLFS 1998/1999. Fixed Effects estimation. Coefficients in bold are significant on the 5% level, 
coefficients in italic are significant on the 10% level. Sample is male full-time workers, not self-employed 
Additional control variables: cubic in age and tenure, years of education, marital status, number of children, ISCO skill levels, job 
position, temporary contract, overtime, firm size, nationality, industry dummies,  regional dummies. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results, females (all coefficients multiplied by 100), 1998-1999 
Variable Mean (1) (2) (3) 
Training, firm sponsored 0.319 -0.014 (0.914) - - 
Training, self-financed 0.210 -1.501 (1.040) -1.497 (1.041) - 
Training stayers      
   firm-sponsored,  0.293 - 0.136 (0946) - 
Training movers     
   firm-sponsored,  0.026 - -1.853 (3.070) - 
   firm-sponsored (quits) 0.023 - - - 
   firm-sponsored (lay-offs) 0.003 - - - 
Match-component     
job change 0.101 3.118 (1.748) 3.576 (1.895) - 
quit 0.079 -   
lay-off 0.022 -   
Number of obs   1504 1504  
Number of persons   752 752  
R-squared – within  0.15 0.15  
R-squared– between  0.03 0.03  
R-squared – overall  0.03 0.03  
Notes: Own calculations, SLFS 1998/1999. Fixed Effects estimation. Coefficients in bold are significant on the 5% level, 
coefficients in italic are significant on the 10% level. Sample is male full-time workers, not self-employed 
Additional control variables: cubic in age and tenure, years of education, marital status, number of children, ISCO skill levels, job 
position, temporary contract, overtime, firm size, nationality, industry dummies,  regional dummies. 
 
 
